This paper presents a new method for specifyiny and analyzing cryptographic protocols. O u r method offers several advantages over previous approaches.
Introduction
In computer networks, communicating parties must share a set of rules describing the messages they will send and receive. These rules, or protocols, are the foundation on which modern networks are built. As protocols are necessary to establish any useful communication, standard sets of rules are published and made widely available. This allows users all over the world to communicate with each other and share information on networks such as the Internet.
Unfortunately, the availability and widespread knowledge of communication protocols has also facilitated the malicious interference of active intruders on the network. To combat this, cryptographic protocols that rely on the encryption of data were developed. It is widely accepted that the security of data in networks should rely on the underlying cryptographic technology, and that the protocols should be open antl available [18] . However, many protocols have been found to be vulnerable to attacks that do not, require breaking the encryption, but instead manipulate the messages in the protocol to gain some advantage. 6 , i', 9, 151, have been pivotal in the ability to use knowledge antl belief in the analysis of cryptographic protocols to discover flaws. All of the logics developed to date reason monotonically. That is, once something is known, it. is always known. This has been a fundamental obstacle in providing a complete logic because negation is missing. This means that there are valid formulas that, cannot) be derived. There have been two attempts to remedy this. Abatli and Tuttle [l] provide a semant,ics for the BAN logic that includes a new construct, for negation. Moser [lo] provides a nonmonotonic logic of belief. However, neither of these deal with nonmonotonicity of knowledge. The differenc.e bet,ween nonmonotonicity of knowledge and nonmonotonicity of belief is discussed in Section 3.
We present, a new method for analyzing protocols. This is the first method proposed for reasoning nonmonotonically about knowledge in cryptographic protocols. Our approach is a variation on the protocol specification techniques of Woo and Lam [19] where each principal's actions are defined separately. In addition, we do not require protocol ideu.lizuhon, and thus avoid many of its associated pitfalls as described by Mao and Boyd [9] . The notation we use is based on the original BAN logic [2] , and we use a similar reasoning mechanism.
We show how our new method can be used to specify and analyze the Needham and Schroeder protocol.
We then use it to analyze the khat protocol [14] , which mes nonmoiiot,onicity of knowledge, antl we show that, Protocol Specification k5s,,,,,ptions
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Figure 1: The Needham and Schroeder protocol specification. Protocols are specified by a principal name, followed by an arrow and another principal name, followed by a message.
no other analysis techniques can be used to analyze this protocol. Finally, our method is used to uncover the flaw in a famous protocol presented by Nessett [13] that he used to demonstrate a weakness in BAN logic.
Protocol Specification in a Distributed System
A typical protocol specification consists of a list of messages between principals. For example, the Needham and Schroeder protocol specification 1111 can be seen in Figure 1 . A 4 B : M means that principal A sends message M to principal B . A protocol designer thus specifies a protocol by listing the messages principals send to each other.
Although such a specification is intuitive, it does not represent the way a protocol is implemented in a distributed system. In a distributed network, each principal need be aware only of his potential role in a protocol. For example, in the Needham and Schroeder protocol presented above, principal S is not concerned with messages 3, 4 and 5. In addition, there are calculations and actions (such as decryption and encryption) performed by principals during the run of a protocol that are not captured by the specification.
The need to idealize protocols before analyzing them is a weakness in this form of protocol specification. In this paper, we propose a new method for specifying protocols that conform to the distributed system model, one that does not require idealization.
The model of Woo and Lam [l9] assigns roles to the principals in a protocol and treats them as independent processes. The actions of the principals are described with no regard to the actions of others in the system. Our method for protocol specification and analysis is based on this notion.
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Figure 2: Protocol analysis with the BAN logic:
The input to BAN is a protocol specification and the initial assumptions. At each step, formulas are attached to the protocol messages, and either a rule is applied, or the logic must halt. If possible, the desired conclusion is reached.
Specifying protocols as in Figure 1 has another disadvantage. Protocol analysis is seen as a process sep arate from the specification. Current analysis techniques take a completed specification as input and attempt to reason about the completed protocol.' For example, Figure 2 is a depiction of the BAN logic [2].
We suggest that protocol analysis should be integrated with the specification process. Thus, as a protocol is developed, beliefs and states of knowledge that represent the current state of the system are updated. At any point, an inconsistency can be detected. This has the advantage of identifying potential causes of problems as well as the actual flaws. When a protocol has been completely specified, the analysis is complete as well.
Nonmonotonicity of Knowledge vs.
Nonmonotonicity of Belief
With few exceptions, previous work in the application of the logic of knowledge and belief to the analysis of cryptographic protocols has considered only monotonic reasoning systems. In these systems, once something is believed, it is always believed. The same applies for knowledge. Monotonic systems have trouble reasoning with incomplete information. A belief that is assumed in the absence of other information, can be nullified by the introduction of new information. However, a monotonic system has no meclianism to do this. In fact, most previous systems have no refutation. The ability to refute beliefs is important for reasoning about protocols. For example, if a session key is compromised, we need to change our belief that this is a good key.
Moser [lo] gives a nonmonotonic logic of belief. This logic is biased towards belief in the absence of information. Thus, a final interpretation of a formula is believed unless there is some information that makes it inconsistent. The logic uses a construct called iinless to achieve this. The value of a formula using unless can be seen from the truth table in Figure 3 (where F is a conjunction of formulas containing the iriiless operator and Bi(y) means that principal i believes y). The 2 in the last row is a special case and is defined as follows: There is no known reasoning system that deals with the nonmonotonicity of knowledge. A situation where such reasoning applies is a protocol that requires a principal to no longer possess information it previously knew. This is different from a principal not believing a statement it previously believed.
The khat protocol [14] , described in Section 4, is an example of a protocol that requires reasoning with nonmonotonicity of knowledge. The protocol relies on a public workstation "forgetting" some information.
The BAN logic, along with its extensions, does not provide a way for representing this behavior.
In this paper, we introduce a method for analyzing protocols such as khat, where information is erased and no longer known by a principal. Our method uses observers sets for each secret that contain the principals who know it. These are similar to the knowledge sets of Kailar et al. [8] . However, Kailar et al. use these sets to reason about. belief, whereas we apply the concept in a slightly different way to reason about, the nonmonotonicity of knowledge.
The KHAT protocol
The k l i d system of Rubin and Honeyman [14] was built to solve the problem of long running jobs in an authenticated environment where a trusted server issues tickets with limited lifetimes for services. Iiliat stands for Kerberizetl ut, and is based on the UNIX ut command. When using this service, a user schedules a job for a future time and date, with tohe option of renewing tickets until the job completes.
When a user submits a khat job, the program creates a spool file containing everything necessary to run the job at a later date, such as environment variables, and sends it to the khat server. The server stores the spool file for the job, and the user's workstation erases it from memory. The khat client, generates a new key, N , which is used to encrypt the secret, key, Ii', that, will serve as the session key when it is time for the job to run, and the server and client, need to communicate. N is also stored by the server and erased by the client. The process of securing the session key, K on the client is depicted in Figure 4 .
The khat protocol is initiated by the usual ticket, granting method in Kerberos. A tic,ket, for the khat service is granted to the client after the initial authentication. This process is well known and is believed to be secure. Toussaint provides a proof that, the kerberos ticket granting protocol is secure [17] . We take the results of the ticket granting process as the initial assumptions in our analysis. Thus, the khut protocol begins after ticket granting c,ompletes.
The khul system can be divided into two phases. Phase I works as follows.
1.
A Kerberos ticket for kliat is granted to the client and a session key is established.
2.
The client generates a spool file for the job. The spool file is sent to the server under the session key.
The server stores the spool file.
The client generates a new key, N , sends { N } K to the server, and erases the spool file and N from its memory.
The server stores N .
For a more complete discussion of khaf the reader is referred to the original paper [14] . It is clear that this protocol cannot be specified as a simple list of messages such as in Figure 1 . The specification method we present in this paper is more appropriate because we can include steps such as step 5 in Phase I.
The analysis depends on the assumptions in our threat model. We are concerned with an active intruder who has access to all network resources and can intercept, replace or delete any message. In addition, we are concerned with vacant workstations and information on them that can be useful to an intruder. This threat is also discussed in the khaf paper [14] . In that paper, an informal discussion of the security risks of khat is given. The method we present here grew out of an attempt to analyze khat more formally, and to provide a method for analysis of any system that must reason about nonmonotonicity of knowledge.
Specifying a Protocol
In this section we provide definitions and notation for specifying a protocol. There are two types of definitions. Those in the first type are global to the protocol, and definitions of the second type are local to each principal.
To accommodate different levels of trust among principals, we place the beliefii of the principals in the local sets. If the assumption were to be made that each principal in the system is either trusted by everyone or trusted by no one, as is the case in many simple authentication systems, then we could have put these beliefs in the global set. To maintain generality, the level of trust and belief will be local. Thus, jurisdiction, the ability to assign session keys, is a belief that must be held by the parties sharing the keys, but not by everyone else.
The protocol designer may wish to specify and analyze a protocol for a system with untrustworthy principals. We include a trust matrix in the specification where the trust between each pair of principals is established. This is explained in Section 5.3.
As pointed out by Mao and Boyd, some statements in the BAN logic are not intuitive, such as the notion of believing a key or a nonce [9] . To remedy this, we define two local sets. One set is composed of the items that a principal possesses, such as encryption keys and nonces. The other set Contains the principal's beliefs, such as the freshness of a key, or the possessions of another principal. Items in the possession sets are labeled by their origin. Each possession is accompanied Phaae I1 occurs when it is time for the job to run. The server Wakes UP Once a minute to see if any blbatjobs are ready. If so, phase I1 is initiated as follows:
1. The server sends N to the client.
2.
The server sends the spool file to the client under the session key, K. 3 . The client runs the job.
by information that either states that it was generated by the principal himself, or states from whom it was received.
We define actions for dealing with the knowledge in a protocol, and inference rules for reasoning about belief. The actions are specified by the protocol designer and can be chosen from a specific set of actions defined below.
Global Sets
The first step of the specification of any protocol using our method is to instantiate the global sets with values. It should be noted the contents of these sets change as a protocol run is simulated in the analysis. The specification of a protocol is simply the starting point of the analysis. In this section we give the definitions of the global sets used for protocol specification.
We introduce W , for world, to represent all the principals. Also, for each set, the subscript n represents its cardinality, but this value changes from set to set.
Principal Set: This set, contains the principals who participate in a protocol. P = {PI, Pz,. . . , P,}.
Any Pi may be marked as an initiator of the protocol. We will assume there is only one initiator. 
Secret Set:
This set contains all of the secrets that exist at any given time in the system. The cardinality of this set changes during the analysis as new secrets, such as session keys, are atlded.
Observers Sets: For each Si, Observers($) contains all the principals who coultl possibly know the secret Si by listening to network traffic or generating it themselves. The members of the Observers sets can be stated explicitly or maintaiiied as formulas representing their membership.
The set, P , contains names of the participants in a protocol.
A typical example might be, P = { A , B , A S } , where A and B are regular principals and AS is the authentication server.
An example of the set, S is { K r , b , K,,, l i b s } . This set contains secret keys held among A and the ailthentication server, among B and the authentication server, and a session key among A and B. The session key would not be a member of S in a specification where I<ab is distributed in the protocol, but would be added to the set during the a.nalysis at the point in which it was generated by the authentication server. This process is discussed in the analysis 
Local Sets
Local sets are private to each principal in a protocol specification. In this section we define these sets. Later, we will show how they are used in the actual specification and analysis of a protocol. For eac,h principal, Pi, we define the following sets:
Possession Set(Pi) This set contains all the data relevant to security that this principal knows or possesses. This includes secret encryption keys, public keys, data that must remain secret, and any other information that is not publicly avail- Opaque( Pi) This set contains candidates to be added to the seen set. It is used by the Update function. The set contains plaintext, message parts and a list of the associated keys needed to see them.
Seen( Pi) This set coiitains plaintext message parts that Pi sees from messages sent across the network. The seen sets collectively contain the same information as the observers sets.
Haskeys(Pi)
This set contains keys that Pi sees either because they are in the initial possession set,, or because they appear in a message sent across the network and are added to Pi's seen set.
2Note that tlie second field represents whether or lint P, generated tlie data, or who sent it to P,. A message operation is one member of the set {Send(Pj, msg), Receive(Pj, msg)}. Send(Pj, msg) means that Pi sends the message, msg to P,. Similarly, Receive(Pj , msg) means that Pi receives message msg from Pj. In this case, msg will be marked as coming from Pi and added to POSS(P;).
In a send operation, msg contains the information transmitted. In a receive operation msg contains the fields of the expected message. This represents Pi's expectation about the structure of the message. This is similar to the notion of recognizability of the GNY logic [7].
An action list is an ordered list of zero or more actions that are performed by Pi. Actions consist of operations such as encryption and decryption, deletion of information, application of functions, and the decision whether to abort the protocol. They are covered in more detail in section 5.5. Every action is followed by a check of the inference rules. If the conditions of a rule are satisfied as a result of the action, then it is applied. These rules are used to update the belief sets of the principals.
Action lists play an important role in protocol specification. Previous approaches to cryptographic protocol analysis take the actions of the principals for granted. Operations such as encryption and decryption are implicit. Our method makes every action explicit, including verification that the operations completed successfully, and an abort in case they did not. This method is a better model of protocol execution in a real system than previous approacbes because all of the actions are included as part of the specification instead of implicitly assumed.
The Trust Matrix
Our method does not require that any assumptions be made about trust between principals. Instead, the protocol designer explicitly specifies the trust relationship between every pair of principals. We define the matrix, TRUST:
The rows and columns enumerate the principals in P .
Obviously, when i = j , TRUSTPJ] = 1. Pi trusts P, means that Pi behaves as though Pj will follow the protocol. We give an example of this using a nonmonotonic protocol.
Say that A believes that B possesses X. Now say that the protocol requires that B forget X. As both A and B know the protocol, B should now remove the belief that B possesses X from its belief set. However, if A does not trust B, then he cannot be sure that B actually no longer possesses X. In the actions described below, we stipulate the condition that A trusts B before removing a belief about the possessions of B .
A Word About Nonces
Message freshness can be guaranteed only with timestamps and nonces. Conceptually, a nonce is a large random number whose purpose is to link a chal- In our model, the only purpose for a nonce is to link a single challenge to a unique response. Therefore, we require that a nonce be used only once. Existing protocols that link a nonce to messages from several principals can easily be modified to meet this requirement.
Actions
Actions describe how a principal constructs messages, encrypts and decrypts data, computes functions, aborts a protocol, and performs any other operation. The action lists that precede and follow message operations in a principal's behavior list det,ermine sequence of events performed by the principal during a protocol run. As demonstrated below, some of the actions replace inference rules in the BAN logic, and others explicitly represent operations that were taken for granted in previous approaches.
In this section we define the actions used in our method, and the following section presents and discusses the inference rules. Our method requires some new notation and dispenses with some previous constructs. As will be shown, the said, sees, controls, and Q E P, constructs of the BAN logic are not needed.
The new definitions follow:
X contains Y means that Y appears as a submessage of the message X, more formally, for some X from P means that X is labeled as having been received from P. This will also be true if P generated X.
3 W e adopt the usual conveiltion of . for concatenation.
LINK(N,) is used to link challenges and responses.
This formula is added to the belief set of a principal who generates the nonce Nn, and allows only one subsequently received message to contain the nonce N o . After such a message is received, the formula is removed from the belief set.
With these new definitions, we now define the actions for a given principal, Pi. Although not specified in the definitions, we assume that f r o m labels are inherited in operations. For example, if {X}k is from Q, and is in POSS(Pj), and this is decrypted, then X is also labeled "from Q" when it is added to POSS(Pj). description: This action is used to break a message into its components. Split is the opposite of concatenation. description: This could happen under various circumstances where there is an inconsistency or other flaw in the protocol specification.
Encrypt(
The difference between actions such as generate and actions such as generote-secret is that items generated as secrets are expected to be sent encrypted, and others are expected to be transmitted in the clear at some point. Many protocols send challenges in the clear; therefore, there is no need to maintain these items as secrets. The actions described above are used to control the knowledge and possessions of the principals in a protocol. Except for Check-freshness and obori, all of the actions modify the possession or Observers sets. Inference rules are used to modify the belief sets.
The difference between actions and inference rules is that actions are explicitly specified as a part of the protocol. Rules, however, are used to reason about the beliefs of principals as the protocol executes. The protocol builder does not explicitly state how belief evolves in a protocol, but rather, states the inference rules that will mechanically control the propagation of belief.
The Update Function
Before discussing inference rules, we define an important function for processing send message operations. When a principal, Pi sends a message to P, on the network, any principal can read it. In our threat model, we view any message as being broadcast and available to all. As pointed out by Nessett, the BAN logic does not deal with protocols in which, for example, a principal publishes a secret key [13] . This is discussed in Section 6.3. The purpose of the Update function is to update the Observers sets of all secrets that are sent on the network.
We give an algorithm for updating the Seen sets for each principal. Updating the Observers seta, given these, is simple.
Notation
The cleartext messages in a message are numbered mi.
For example, in the message (21, ( 2 2 , k3}k1 , 2 4 , 22}ka ml = 21, m2 = 2 2 , m3 = k3, m4 = 2 4 , and mr, = 2 2 .
keys[mi] is a set containing the keys appearing in W .
In our example, keys[ma] = { k 3 } , and keysjml] = 4.
Finally, needs[mi]
is the set of keys needed to see mi. In our example, needs[mz] = { k l , 12}, and needs[m4] = { k 2 } . These sets can be obtained by reading the keys used to encrypt a plaintext submessage from the inside out.
The Algorithm
When a message appears, each principal, P , inspects it, decrypts it insofar as possible, and accumulates any secrets found ~i t h i n .~
V interior mi
(1)
(2) While changes occur to huslceys(P)
Vmi E opuque(P) (8) At each iteration, either keys are added to haskeys(P) or the algorithm halts. Because the number of keys is finite, it will eventually halt.
Lemma:
For a principal, P, mi is added to seen(P) if and only if P eventually sees all of the keys needed to decrypt mi. In other words, at some point in the execution of the algorithm, seen(P) += na;
necds[ni;] C haskeys( P).
Proof by induction on the number of keys needed to see mi.
Inference Rules
When using our method, the protocol developer must choose from the eleven actions defined above. In addition, we define inference rules, such as the nonce verification rule of the BAN logic, that are triggered whenever they apply. 111 our method, rules are is specified a bit differently.
The nonce verification rule as defined by Burrows et (11.
[2] is not entirely intuitive. Their rule is: P believes # ( X ) , P believes Q said X P believes Q believes X 'The notation we use in this algoritlim is si11ular to that of the C proganuning language. X += Y is the same as X := x + Y.
It is not clear what it means for
Q to believe X , if X is a nonce. In our method, if P received X from Q, then X E POSS(P;), and X will be labeled as being from Q. We define the nonce verification rule as follows:
( X E POSS(Q)) E B E L ( P ) , # ( X ) E B E L ( P ) , X from Q E P O S S ( P ) B E L ( P ) := B E L ( P ) U {Q believes # ( X ) }
The first condition, ( X E POSS(Q)) E B E L ( P ) is necessary to authenticate X as coming from Q. This condition can only be true after the message meaning rule (defined below) is applied. Thus, P can establish that Q believes that X is fresh, and this fact is added to P's belief set, B E L ( P ) . Notice that, rules are used to propagate belief during a protocol run, whereas actions deal with knowledge.
The message meaning rule is defined in BAN as:
P believes Q E P, P sees {X},< P believes Q said X This rule states that if P believes that Q and P share a secret, key, K , and P sees X, encrypted under Ii', and P did not encrypt X under I<, then P believes that, Q once said X . This implies that knowing a principal shares a secret key with another principal is enough to guarantee that any message enaypted under that key was sent by that, principal. In our rule, this requirementn is made explicit. We define the message meaning rule as follows:
This rule states that if { X } k was received by P , from Q , and both P and Q know the key k , then P believes that Q possesses X. This is possible bec.ause messages are labeled with their origin when they are added to the possession set. When principal P applies action 2 (decrypt), X will be in his possession set. Another rule is needed to reason about the freshness of submessages:
This rule states that if P believes that 21 is fresh, and P possesses a formula containing both "1 and 22, then P believes that z2 is fresh. This rule reflects the fact, that any part of a message which contains somet#hing fresh, is fresh.
The following rule is the most important inference rule for reasoning about freshness in a protocol. The only way for a message to be fresh is for it to contain a valid time-stamp or a nonce that has never previously been used in a response. The rule for determining freshness using a nonce is the linkage rule: X contains f(N,) , X contains 21, { X } , from Q E POSS(P)
This rule is simpler than its unfortunate length makes it appear. It is the only rule that can be used to add information about the freshness of an item which is not known to contain fresh submessages, to a principal's belief set.
The linkage rule states that the submessages of a message X are believed to be fresh under certain conditions. If LINK (N.) is in P's belief set, then the nonce N, has not been used before. This is the first condition. If the rule is applied successfully, the LINK item is removed. So the rule could not fire again for the same nonce. Other conditions state that the nonce N, must be sealed under a key that is fresh, and must be available to P . The rule states that message X must contain f ( N . )
to represent the fact that sometimes a function of a nonce, rather than the actual nonce is used to respond to a challenge. The net result of applying this rule is that any submessage of a valid response to a challenge is believed to be fresh by the recipient of the response. Also, there is a guarantee that any replay of a valid response will not result in a principal believing that the submessages are fresh.
B E L ( P ) := ( B E L ( P ) -L I N K ( N a ) ) U {#(XI)}
How It All Works
The analysis of a protocol proceeds from the specification. It may be a partial specification or a whole one. Figure 6 shows the flow of control in the analysis of a protocol with two principals. One action is marked as the first, and this is where the analysis begins. The conditions of the action are tested, and if they are true, the results are applied. Otherwise, the analysis aborts because the specification is unsound.
After the results are applied, any relevant inference rules are applied. There are no race conditions, where the results of one inference rule negate the preconditions of another, because the inference rules are monotonic. Only actions can result in the deletion of information. Therefore, the order of the rules does not matter. The rules only fire once for any given set of preconditions, and as the number of data elements is finite, this process will eventually halt. At this point, the current action is marked as seen. The analysis then moves to the next action in the same action list. If the action is a send message operation, then the following action must be an Update function call. After the Observers sets are updated, the analysis moves to the first unseen receive action in the action list of the principal specified. in the send.
When Update is called, the Observers sets are updated according to the algorithm described in Section 5.6. If there is a send that is not followed by a call to Update, then the specification is not sound.
After the analysis completes, the protocol designer checks if all of the actions are seen. If they are not, then there is a problem with the protocol. Flaws can be detected at any point in the analysis. There are many different ways to use this technique to discover them. For example, the Observers set of a secret may contain the wrong principals. If the analysis does not conclude that a data item is fresh, then a replay attack is possible. In addition, an intruder's moves can be modeled as a participant, in the protocol, which can be checked for known attacks.
Examples
The best way to explain how a protocol is analyzed using our method is by example. In section 6.1, the Needham and Schroeder protocol is specified, and we step through the analysis. In section 6.2, we apply our method to the klcat protocol.
Needham and Schroeder
First we specify the protocol, and then we show how our method can be used to analyze it. We demonstrate that the known flaw in the protocol exists; principal B cannot achieve the belief that the session key with A is fresh. Then, we show how the addition of two messages, as proposed by Needham and Schroeder (in a later paper [12] ) to solve the problem, allows B to achieve the desired belief.
The Specification
The Needham and Schroeder protocol assumes that both A and E trust S. So, the trust matrix contains 1s in the appropriate spots to represent this. The trust between A and B is irrelevant, and so the matrix values do not matter.
P = { S , B , A}.
A is marked as the initiator of the protocol. R contains the rules defined in Section 5.7. S = {KO, , Kbs}. Each of these secret keys has an Obseruers set. Obseruers(K,,) = {A, S} and Obseruers(K~,) = { B , S}. Some of these sets will change once the analysis begins.
Next, we define the initial values of the local sets. Notice that initially, principals believe in the freshness of the key they share with the server, S . Similarly, the server believes in the freshness of its shared secret with each principal. Also, P W KPq represents the key, Zi;, and the fact that it is to be used for communicating with principal P . In this protocol, the function f subtracts one from its argument. Once the protocol has been specified, t,he analysis begins. However, the analysis technique described here can be used to test the protocol as it, is being developed. The first action in BL(A) is marked with a because A is the initiator of the protocol. For each action, its condition is tested. If it does not hold, the protocol analysis is aborted, and the specification is infeasible. If the Condition holds, theh the result is applied and the required sets are updated. Next, the inference rules are examined to see if any apply. Finally, the action is marked with a o to show that, it, has been successful, and the mark, 0 , is moved to the next action.
Every Send action is followed by an Update action. The Send action specifies to whom the message is sent,. After an Update action, the mark moves to the first Receive action with no o of the principal identified in the corresponding Send action.
The Analysis
The first four actions in BL(A) are executed resulting in new members of the sets POSS(A) and BEL(A).
Also, the Update action causes 06seruers(Na) = W .
So far, no inference rules can be applied.
Receive ( 
KHAT
Our analysis reveals a significant flaw in the khat protocol. We provide a fix to the protocol, and use the analysis to demonstrate that the flaw no longer exists.
The Specification
The khat protocol involves two principals: the client (C) and the server ( S ) . In this protocol, the trust matrix must reflect the fact that they trust each other. The client trusts the server to issue valid tickets, and the server trusts the client to forget, the information specified in the protocol. If the TRUST [i,j] , where i is the server and j is the client, is not 1, then the server will not believe that the client, no longer possesses information which sliould be forgotten. Thus, a fundamental assumption of the protocol is identified.
When phase I begins, we assume that a secure channel has been established using the Kerberos ticket. for the khat service. Thus, Zi' is the session key between C and SI and Olserwers(K) = {C, S } . P = { S , C } , C is marked as the initiator, and S = {Zi'}. In this specification, SF represents the spool file for the user's job.
The local sets are now defined:
Send (S,Encrypt(Concat(SF, N ) , Ii))
Our method for analyzing cryptographic protocols does not include temporal reasoning. Thus, we specify and analyze the two phases of the khat protocol separately.
One advantage of our method is that the khat protocol can be specified in the same manner as the Needham and Schroeder protocol; we specify all the global Server POSS(S) = {I<} and local sets. The behavior lists will contain actions 'FoI coxnpleteriess sake, we sliould also specify to forget ( S F .
nique.
iiuplerrieritatiori) .
B E L ( S )
= {#(K)} B L ( S ) = Receive(C, { S F N } K ) Decrypt({SF . N } K , IC) Split({SF. N}) Generate-secret (TGTc ) Send(Concat( N,Encrypt( Concat (SF, TGTc ) , 10)) Update({N . {SF ~T G T C } K } ) Phase I1
The Analysis
We begin our analysis with Phase I of the protocol. After the analysis reaches tlie first Forget-secret statement, the local sets are as follows (once again we omit some encrypted items in the possession and belief sets that don't contribute to the analysis, for the sake of clarity) :
Notice that the server cannot conclude # ( S F ) or #(N). This is a serious flaw because an intruder can use a replay attack for the remainder of the session6 to reschedule the user's job.
To solve this problem, we modify the protocol so that along with the khat ticket, the server sends a list of fresh nonces to the client. Each time the user schedules a job, he includes an unused nonce in the message. In the analysis, the server will have a collection of B E L ( S ) = {#(fa 6That is, the remaining bfetiriie of the khat ticket from the ticket granting service.
LINK statements in its belief set, and the freshness of N and SF can be guaranteed.
The Corrected Protocol
The corrected protocol is as follows: If an intruder attempts to replay the message containing the spool file, the server will recognize that the nonce, Ni has already been used. In the analysis, this is reflected by the absence of L I N K ( N 1 ) from EEL(S). The linkage rule cannot be applied in this case. Thus, the server will not conclude that the spool file in the replayed message is fresh, and the protocol will be aborted. We continue our analysis with the client's actions:
Clieiit
POSS(C)
After these actions, N and SF are removed from To preserve space, we include only the most interesting part of the analysis that, remains. When phase I1 begins, the next three actions are the server's.
After the Update action, Obscrvers(N) = W . Thus, if an intruder has compromised the workstation and obtained {IC}N, then the secrecy of K has also been lost. Thus, analysis reveals that once it is time for the job to run, a previous compromise of the workstation results in an insecure session key. This further results in the compromise of the TGT.
Our analysis reveals a new vulnerability in phase I1 of k h a t Although the analysis did not mechanically produce this result, use of our technique generated conclusions from which the vulnerability became apparent. In Section 7 we discuss how to test a protocol for known weaknesses.
Nessett criticism
In a well known note, Nessett criticizes the BAN logic [13] . He presents the following protocol that, uses assymetric keys : A + B : {No,I<,b}~Ca-~ B -+ A : {Na}ic.s
The problem is that, K , b is encrypted under A's private key. Thus, anyone intercepting the first, message can decrypt it with the corresponding public. key and obtain the session key.
Although inference rules for public keys are not included in this paper, it is not difficult to construct, appropriate rules and to acltl them to the global set, R of inference rules. Once the protocol is specified, analysis immediately reveals the flaw. After the first, message is sent, the update function sets Obscrvers(K,a) to W because the 0bscruer.s set, of the public key K, is W .
Furthermore, B does not believe that, K a b is fresh: in addition to its obvious and intended flaw, the Nessetk protocol uses nonces improperly.
Analyzing Known Threats
Our specification and analysis technique can also be used to test a protocol against a known attack. This is done by including the intruder, Z , in the set, of principals. B L ( 2 ) contains the actions that the intruder performs. The analysis determines what 2 is able to learn during the course of the protocol. The trust matrix can even be used to analyze what, happens when 2 is actually trusted.
By specifying B L ( Z ) differently, one can determine whether an intruder could trick a participant into revealing some sensitive information using a given atstack. In this sense, a user can interact with the analysis to check a new protocol for given flaws and vulnerabilities.
Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce a new method for specifying authentication protocols that offers several advantages over existing methods. The method also includes a logical analysis based on the propagation of belief and knowledge. A fundamental assumption in our threat model is that any message in the system is essentially a broadcast.
We specify protocols as a collection of independent processes. This model closely resembles the structure of the actual distributed system in which the protocols are implemented. Our specifications are designed to resemble the actual implementation as much as possible. This eliminates flaws introduced in the process of converting a specification (which may contain no flaws itself) t o an actual program.
One weakness of many analysis techniques that require protocol idealization is that flaws in the protocol may not appear in the idealized version. Thus, the analysis is incapable of revealing them. Our method does not require idealization and thus avoids this problem.
We demonstrate that our method can be used to reason about a new class of protocols for which previous approaches are inadequate. We use actions such as Forget and Forgat-secret along with knowledge and belief sets to reason about nonmonotonicity of knowledge in protocols.
The Needham and Schroeder protocol has become a benchmark used by designers of analysis techniques to test their methods. We demonstrate how the known flaw in that protocol is revealed. In addition, we use our method to uncover a new flaw in our klrut protocol and to discover a vulnerability in phase I1 of the protocol. Finally, we show that our method easily uncovers flaws in protocols, such as Nessett's, that methods such as BAN cannot detect.
h t u r e Work
The method presented in this paper has been used to discover flaws in the khat protocol. The analysis would be even better if we could make some claim about the soundness and completeness of tlie reasoning. One possible way to do this is to define the semantics of the logic. However, it is not clear that these properties hold, and useful semantics of logics of authentication are extremely rare because of the difficulty of defining them.
We would like to use the techniques we have developed to specify and analyze other protocols as well as the ones presented here. In particular, the ability to specify and analyze protocols with nonmonotonicity of knowledge opens the door to a whole new class of protocols. One possible application of this method involves analyzing aspects of public key systems, which rely on forgetting some large primes, in a new way. Previous approaches take for granted that when a principal generates a key, it discards the pieces 115 necessary to reconstruct it. Our method gives a user the flexibility to analyze the system with finer granularity.
It is our hope that methods such as the one we present in this paper will help in the development of protocols with higher assurance of security.
